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Abstract
The VoicePrivacy initiative aims to promote the development of
privacy preservation tools for speech technology by gathering a
new community to define the tasks of interest and the evaluation
methodology, and benchmarking solutions through a series of
challenges. In this paper, we formulate the voice anonymization
task selected for the VoicePrivacy 2020 Challenge and describe
the datasets used for system development and evaluation. We
also present the attack models and the associated objective and
subjective evaluation metrics. We introduce two anonymization
baselines and report objective evaluation results.
Index Terms: privacy, anonymization, speech synthesis, voice
conversion, speaker verification, automatic speech recognition
1. Introduction
Recent years have seen mounting calls for the preservation of
privacy when treating or storing personal data. This is not
least the result of the European general data protection regu-
lation (GDPR). While there is no legal definition of privacy [1],
speech data encapsulates a wealth of personal information that
can be revealed by listening or by automated systems [2]. This
includes, e.g., age, gender, ethnic origin, geographical back-
ground, health or emotional state, political orientations, and re-
ligious beliefs, among others [3, p. 62]. In addition, speaker
recognition systems can reveal the speaker’s identity. It is
thus of no surprise that efforts to develop privacy preservation
solutions for speech technology are starting to emerge. The
VoicePrivacy initiative aims to gather a new community to de-
fine the tasks of interest and the evaluation methodology, and to
benchmark these solutions through a series of challenges.
Current methods fall into four categories: deletion, encryp-
tion, distributed learning, and anonymization. Deletion meth-
ods [4, 5] are meant for ambient sound analysis. They delete or
obfuscate any overlapping speech to the point where no infor-
mation about it can be recovered. Encryption methods [6, 7]
such as fully homomorphic encryption [8] and secure multi-
party computation [9], support computation upon data in the
encrypted domain. They incur significant increases in computa-
tional complexity, which require special hardware. Decentral-
ized or federated learning methods aim to learn models from
distributed data without accessing it directly [10]. The derived
data used for learning (e.g., model gradients) may still leak in-
formation about the original data, however [11].
Anonymization refers to the goal of suppressing person-
ally identifiable attributes of the speech signal, leaving all other
attributes intact1. Past and recent attempts have focused on
1In the legal community, the term “anonymization” means that this
goal has been achieved. Here, it refers to the task to be addressed, even
when the method being evaluated has failed. We expect the VoicePri-
vacy initiative to lead to the definition of new, unambiguous terms.
noise addition [12], speech transformation [13], voice conver-
sion [14–16], speech synthesis [17, 18], or adversarial learn-
ing [19]. In contrast to the above categories of methods, anony-
mization appears to be more flexible since it can selectively sup-
press or retain certain attributes and it can easily be integrated
within existing systems. Despite the appeal of anonymization
and the urgency to address privacy concerns, a formal defini-
tion of anonymization and attacks against it is missing. Further-
more, the level of anonymization offered by existing solutions
is unclear and not meaningful because there are no common
datasets, protocols and metrics.
For these reasons, the VoicePrivacy 2020 Challenge focuses
on the task of speech anonymization. This paper is intended as a
general reference about the Challenge for researchers, engineers
and privacy professionals. Details for participants are provided
in the evaluation plan [20] and on the challenge website2.
The paper is structured as follows. The anonymization task
and the attack models, the datasets, and the metrics are de-
scribed in Sections 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The two baseline
systems and the corresponding objective evaluation results are
presented in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.
2. Anonymization task and attack models
Privacy preservation is formulated as a game between users who
publish some data and attackers who access this data or data
derived from it and wish to infer information about the users
[21, 22]. To protect their privacy, the users publish data that
contain as little personal information as possible while allowing
one or more downstream goals to be achieved. To infer personal
information, the attackers may use additional prior knowledge.
Focusing on speech data, a given privacy preservation sce-
nario is specified by: (i) the nature of the data: waveform, fea-
tures, etc., (ii) the information seen as personal: speaker iden-
tity, traits, spoken contents, etc., (iii) the downstream goal(s):
human communication, automated processing, model training,
etc., (iv) the data accessed by the attackers: one or more ut-
terances, derived data or model, etc., (v) the attackers’ prior
knowledge: previously published data, privacy preservation
method applied, etc. Different specifications lead to different
privacy preservation methods from the users’ point of view and
different attacks from the attackers’ point of view.
2.1. Privacy preservation scenario
VoicePrivacy 2020 considers the following scenario, where the
terms “user” and “speaker” are used interchangeably. Speakers
want to hide their identity while still allowing all other down-
stream goals to be achieved. Attackers have access to one or
more utterances and want to identify the speakers.
2https://www.voiceprivacychallenge.org/
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2.2. Anonymization task
To hide his/her identity, each speaker passes his/her utterances
through an anonymization system. The resulting anonymized
utterances are referred to as trial data. They sound as if they had
been uttered by another speaker called pseudo-speaker, which
may be an artificial voice not corresponding to any real speaker.
The task of challenge participants is to design this anony-
mization system. In order to allow all downstream goals to be
achieved, this system should: (a) output a speech waveform,
(b) hide speaker identity as much as possible, (c) distort other
speech characteristics as little as possible, (d) ensure that all
trial utterances from a given speaker appear to be uttered by
the same pseudo-speaker, while trial utterances from different
speakers appear to be uttered by different pseudo-speakers3.
Requirement (c) is assessed via utility metrics: automatic
speech recognition (ASR) decoding error rate using a model
trained on original, i.e., unprocessed data and subjective speech
intelligibility and naturalness (see Section 4). Requirement (d)
and additional downstream goals including ASR training will
be assessed in a post-evaluation phase (see Section 6).
2.3. Attack models
The attackers have access to: (a) one or more anonymized trial
utterances, (b) possibly, original or anonymized enrollment ut-
terances for each speaker. They do not have access to the ano-
nymization system applied by the user. The protection of per-
sonal information is assessed via privacy metrics, including ob-
jective speaker verifiability and subjective speaker verifiability
and linkability. These metrics assume different attack models.
The objective speaker verifiability metrics assume that the
attackers have access to a single anonymized trial utterance and
several enrollment utterances. Two sets of metrics are used for
original vs. anonymized enrollment data (see Section 4.1). In
the latter case, we assume that the trial and enrollment utter-
ances of a given speaker have been anonymized using the same
system, but the corresponding pseudo-speakers are different.
The subjective speaker verifiability metric (Section 4.2) as-
sumes that the attackers have access to a single anonymized trial
utterance and a single original enrollment utterance. Finally, the
subjective speaker linkability metric (Section 4.2) assumes that
the attackers have access to several anonymized trial utterances.
3. Datasets
Several publicly available corpora are used for the training, de-
velopment and evaluation of speaker anonymization systems.
3.1. Training set
The training set comprises the 2,800 h VoxCeleb-1,2 speaker
verification corpus [23,24] and 600 h subsets of the LibriSpeech
[25] and LibriTTS [26] corpora, which were initially designed
for ASR and speech synthesis, respectively. The selected sub-
sets are detailed in Table 1 (top).
3.2. Development set
The development set comprises LibriSpeech dev-clean and a
subset of the VCTK corpus [27] denoted as VCTK-dev (see Ta-
3This is akin to “pseudonymization”, which replaces each user’s
identifiers by a unique key. We do not use this term here, since it often
refers to the distinct case when the identifiers are tabular data and the
data controller stores the correspondence table linking users and keys.
Table 1: Number of speakers and utterances in the VoicePrivacy
2020 training, development, and evaluation sets.
Subset Female Male Total #Utter.
Tr
ai
ni
ng
VoxCeleb-1,2 2,912 4,451 7,363 1,281,762
LibriSpeech train-clean-100 125 126 251 28,539
LibriSpeech train-other-500 564 602 1,166 148,688
LibriTTS train-clean-100 123 124 247 33,236
LibriTTS train-other-500 560 600 1,160 205,044
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t LibriSpeech Enrollment 15 14 29 343
dev-clean Trial 20 20 40 1,978
Enrollment 600
VCTK-dev Trial (common) 15 15 30 695
Trial (different) 10,677
E
va
lu
at
io
n LibriSpeech Enrollment 16 13 29 438
test-clean Trial 20 20 40 1,496
Enrollment 600
VCTK-test Trial (common) 15 15 30 70
Trial (different) 10,748
ble 1, middle). With the above attack models in mind, we split
them into trial and enrollment subsets. For LibriSpeech dev-
clean, the speakers in the enrollment set are a subset of those
in the trial set. For VCTK-dev, we use the same speakers for
enrollment and trial and we consider two trial subsets, denoted
as common and different. The common trial subset is composed
of utterances #1−24 in the VCTK corpus that are identical for
all speakers. This is meant for subjective evaluation of speaker
verifiability/linkability in a text-dependent manner. The enroll-
ment and different trial subsets are composed of distinct utter-
ances for all speakers.
3.3. Evaluation set
Similarly, the evaluation set comprises LibriSpeech test-clean
and a subset of VCTK called VCTK-test (see Table 1, bottom).
4. Utility and privacy metrics
Following the attack models in Section 2.3, we consider objec-
tive and subjective privacy metrics to assess anonymization per-
formance in terms of speaker verifiability and linkability. We
also propose objective and subjective utility metrics to assess
whether the requirements in Section 2.2 are fulfilled.
4.1. Objective metrics
For objective evaluation, we train two systems to assess speaker
verifiability and ASR decoding error. The first system denoted
ASVeval is an automatic speaker verification (ASV) system,
which produces log-likelihood ratio (LLR) scores. The sec-
ond system denoted ASReval is an ASR system which outputs a
word error rate (WER). Both are trained on LibriSpeech train-
clean-360 using Kaldi [28].
4.1.1. Objective speaker verifiability
The ASVeval system for speaker verifiability evaluation relies
on x-vector speaker embeddings and probabilistic linear dis-
criminant analysis (PLDA) [29]. Three metrics are computed:
the equal error rate (EER) and the LLR-based costs Cllr and
Cminllr . Denoting by Pfa(θ) and Pmiss(θ) the false alarm and
miss rates at threshold θ, the EER corresponds to the thresh-
old θEER at which the two detection error rates are equal, i.e.,
EER = Pfa(θEER) = Pmiss(θEER). Cllr is computed from PLDA
scores as defined in [30, 31]. It can be decomposed into a dis-
crimination loss (Cminllr ) and a calibration loss (Cllr−Cminllr ). Cminllr
is estimated by optimal calibration using monotonic transforma-
tion of the scores to their empirical LLR values.
As shown in Fig. 1, these metrics are computed
and compared for: (1) original trial and enrollment data,
(2) anomymized trial data and original enrollment data,
(3) anomymized trial and enrollment data. The number of target
and impostor trials is given in Table 2.
Test trials Enrollment
ASVeval
ASVevalAnonymization
.
ASVevalAnonymization
.
Anonymization
.
EER, Cllr
EER, Cllr
EER, Cllr
1
2
3
Figure 1: ASV evaluation.
Table 2: Number of speaker verification trials.
Subset Trials Female Male Total
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t LibriSpeech Target 704 644 1,348
dev-clean Impostor 14,566 12,796 27,362
VCTK-dev
Target (common) 344 351 695
Target (different) 1,781 2,015 3,796
Impostor (common) 4,810 4,911 9,721
Impostor (different) 13,219 12,985 26,204
E
va
lu
at
io
n
LibriSpeech Target 548 449 997
test-clean Impostor 11,196 9,457 20,653
VCTK-test
Target (common) 346 354 700
Target (different) 1,944 1,742 3,686
Impostor (common) 4,838 4,952 9,790
Impostor (different) 13,056 13,258 26,314
4.1.2. ASR decoding error
ASReval is based on the state-of-the-art Kaldi recipe for Lib-
riSpeech involving a factorized time delay neural network
(TDNN-F) acoustic model (AM) [32, 33] and a trigram lan-
guage model. As shown in Fig. 2, the (1) original and (2)
anonymized trial data is decoded using the provided pretrained
ASReval model and the corresponding WERs are calculated.
Test trials
ASReval
ASRevalAnonymization
.
WER
WER
1
2
Figure 2: ASR decoding evaluation.
4.2. Subjective metrics
Subjective metrics include speaker verifiability, speaker linka-
bility, speech intelligibility, and speech naturalness. They will
be evaluated using listening tests carried out by the organizers.
4.2.1. Subjective speaker verifiability
To evaluate subjective speaker verifiability, listeners are given
pairs of one anonymized trial utterance and one distinct original
enrollment utterance of the same speaker. Following [34], they
are instructed to imagine a scenario in which the anonymized
sample is from an incoming telephone call, and to rate the sim-
ilarity between the voice and the original voice using a scale
of 1 to 10, where 1 denotes ‘different speakers’ and 10 denotes
‘the same speaker’ with highest confidence. The performance
of each anonymization system will be visualized through detec-
tion error tradeoff (DET) curves.
4.2.2. Subjective speaker linkability
The second subjective metric assesses speaker linkability, i.e.,
the ability to cluster several utterances into speakers. Listen-
ers are asked to place a set of anonymized trial utterances from
different speakers in a 1- or 2-dimensional space according to
speaker similarity. This relies on a graphical interface, where
each utterance is represented as a point in space and the distance
between two points expresses subjective speaker dissimilarity.
4.2.3. Subjective speech intelligibility
Listeners are also asked to rate the intelligibility of individual
samples (anonymized trial utterances or original enrollment ut-
terances) on a scale from 1 (totally unintelligible) to 10 (totally
intelligible). The results can be visualized through DET curves.
4.2.4. Subjective speech naturalness
Finally, the naturalness of the anonymized speech will be evalu-
ated on a scale from 1 (totally unnatural) to 10 (totally natural).
5. Baseline software and results
Two anonymization baselines are provided.4 We briefly intro-
duce them and report the corresponding objective results below.
5.1. Anonymization baselines
The primary baseline shown in Fig. 3 is inspired from [17] and
comprises three steps: (1) extraction of x-vector [29], pitch (F0)
and bottleneck (BN) features; (2) x-vector anonymization; (3)
speech synthesis (SS) from the anonymized x-vector and the
original F0+BN features. In Step 1, 256-dimensional BN fea-
tures encoding spoken content are extracted using a TDNN-
F ASR AM trained on LibriSpeech train-clean-100 and train-
other-500 using Kaldi. A 512-dimensional x-vector encoding
the speaker is extracted using a TDNN trained on VoxCeleb-
1,2 with Kaldi. In Step 2, for every source x-vector, an
4https://github.com/Voice-Privacy-Challenge/
Voice-Privacy-Challenge-2020
Figure 3: Primary baseline anonymization system.
Table 3: Speaker verifiability achieved by the pretrained ASVeval model. The primary baseline is used for anonymization.
Dataset Gender Anonymization Development TestEnroll Trial EER (%) Cminllr Cllr EER (%) C
min
llr Cllr
LibriSpeech
Female original
original 8.67 0.304 42.86 7.66 0.183 26.79
anonymized 50.28 0.997 146.01 48.54 0.996 151.37anonymized 35.09 0.876 15.19 29.74 0.797 14.00
Male original
original 1.24 0.034 14.25 1.11 0.041 15.30
anonymized 58.39 0.998 168.50 53.23 0.999 167.14anonymized 29.66 0.806 20.08 32.52 0.835 26.54
VCTK
Female original
original 2.86 0.100 1.13 4.89 0.169 1.50
(different)
anonymized 50.03 0.988 162.91 48.87 0.999 142.40anonymized 29.48 0.814 10.24 34.21 0.884 12.33
Male original
original 1.44 0.052 1.16 2.07 0.072 1.82
anonymized 55.33 1.000 166.50 53.73 1.000 165.62anonymized 26.10 0.756 18.81 25.83 0.743 16.31
Table 4: ASR decoding error achieved by the pretrained
ASReval model. The primary baseline is used.
Dataset Anonymization Dev. WER (%) Test WER (%)
LibriSpeech original 3.83 4.14anonymized 6.50 6.77
VCTK original 10.79 12.81
(comm.+diff.) anonymized 15.50 15.53
anonymized x-vector is computed by finding the N farthest x-
vectors in an external pool (LibriTTS train-other-500) accord-
ing to the PLDA distance, and by averaging N∗ randomly se-
lected vectors among them5. In Step 3, an SS AM generates
Mel-filterbank features given the anonymized x-vector and the
F0+BN features, and a neural source-filter (NSF) waveform
model [35] outputs a speech signal given the anonymized x-
vector, the F0, and the generated Mel-filterbank features. The
SS AM and NSF models are both trained on LibriTTS train-
clean-100. See [20, 36] for further details.
The secondary baseline is a simpler, formant-shifting ap-
proach provided as additional inspiration [37].
5.2. Objective evaluation results
Table 3 reports the values of objective speaker verifiability met-
rics obtained before/after anonymization with the primary base-
line.6 The EER and Cminllr metrics behave similarly, while inter-
pretation of Cllr is more challenging due to non-calibration7.
We hence focus on the EER below. On all datasets, anonymiza-
tion of the trial data greatly increases the EER. This shows that
the anonymization baseline effectively increases the users’ pri-
vacy. The EER estimated with original enrollment data (49 to
58%), which is comparable to or above the chance value (50%),
suggests that full anonymization has been achieved. However,
anonymized enrollment data result in a much lower EER (26 to
35%), which suggests that F0+BN features retain some infor-
mation about the original speaker. If the attackers have access
to such enrollment data, they will be able to re-identify users
almost half of the time. Note also that the EER is larger for
females than males on average. This further demonstrates that
failing to define the attack model or assuming a naive attack
model leads to a greatly overestimated sense of privacy [22].
5In the baseline, we use N = 200 and N∗ = 100.
6Results on VCTK (common) are omitted due to space constraints.
7In particular, Cllr > 1 is not a problem, since we care more about
discrimination metrics than score calibration metrics in the first edition.
Table 4 reports the WER achieved before/after anonymiza-
tion with the primary baseline. While the absolute WER stays
below 7% on LibriSpeech and 16% on VCTK, anonymization
incurs a large WER increase of 21 to 70% relative.
The results achieved by the secondary baseline are inferior
and detailed in [20]. Overall, there is substantial potential for
challenge participants to improve over the two baselines.
6. Conclusions
The VoicePrivacy initiative aims to promote the development
of private-by-design speech technology. Our initial event, the
VoicePrivacy 2020 Challenge, provides a complete evaluation
protocol for voice anonymization systems. We formulated the
voice anonymization task as a game between users and attack-
ers, and highlighted three possible attack models. We also de-
signed suitable datasets and evaluation metrics, and we released
two open-source baseline voice anonymization systems. Fu-
ture work includes evaluating and comparing the participants’
systems using objective and subjective metrics, computing al-
ternative objective metrics relating to, e.g., requirement (d) in
Section 2.2, and drawing initial conclusions regarding the best
anonymization strategies for a given attack model. A revised,
stronger evaluation protocol is also expected as an outcome.
In this regard, it is essential to realize that the users’ down-
stream goals and the attack models listed above are not exhaus-
tive. For instance, beyond ASR decoding, anonymization is ex-
tremely useful in the context of anonymized data collection for
ASR training [19]. It is also known that the EER becomes lower
when the attackers generate anonymized training data and re-
trainsASVeval on this data [22]. In order to assess these aspects,
we will ask volunteer participants to share additional data with
us and run additional experiments in a post-evaluation phase.
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